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Title: Lifelong Learning and Income Inequality in Singapore: A Critical Appraisal.  
 
Abstract 
Singapore has been assigned the role of a ‘model’ nation state primarily for two reasons: its 
rapid rate of economic growth and its outstanding performance on cross national tests of 
educational achievement, such as PISA. This has resulted in advocates of reform citing it as 
illustrating ‘best practices’, especially in the field of education, and it has more generally 
been viewed as demonstrating the benefits of economic globalization. This paper analyses 
from a comparative perspective the more problematic and relatively unexplored third 
dimension of being a model ‘global’ nation, namely its impact on income inequality and the 
quality of citizens’ life. We focus on the role of the system of lifelong learning which was 
designed generally to upgrade the skills of the workforce and specifically to provide low 
paid/skilled workers with opportunities to improve incomes and enhance their socio-
economic mobility. We demonstrate that despite the remarkable economic growth at a 
national level and the significant expansion of lifelong learning provision, productivity rates 
have not improved, income inequality has increased, social mobility has declined and the 
‘quality of life’ is, in comparative terms, poor.  
 
Introduction 
Singapore’s approach to national development has embodied two distinctive strategies; it has 
enthusiastically embraced the tenets of neo-liberalism and  globalization whilst operating as a 
classic model of a developmental state (Castells, 1992; Woo-Cummings, 1999) in which an 
interventionist government prioritises, and obtains its legitimacy from, the pursuit of  rapid 
economic growth. The first strategy is evident in the country’s active engagement in the 
‘global knowledge economy’ and the ‘global war for talent’; this has, inter alia, resulted in 
the importation of high-skilled foreign labour, which, together with low-skilled foreign 
labour, makes up a significant proportion of the labour force. The second is evident in the 
construction by the state of a comprehensive system of lifelong learning. The two are 
strongly interconnected: lifelong learning is portrayed as providing the means by which local 
workers can both better compete in the global knowledge economy and improve their income 
levels by upgrading their skills.  
 
This article analyses the policy narrative promoted in Singapore with regard to lifelong 
learning and income inequality .This is then contrasted with the current issues faced by the 
low-paid/skilled; namely: differential provision of lifelong learning opportunities; enduring 
patterns of income inequality; declining socio-economic mobility; social services; and, 
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comparatively weak levels of societal trust and happiness. These features are also compared 
with the situation in other OECD nations. 
 
While lifelong learning officially took off as one of the key development strategies in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in late 1997, forms of technical and vocational 
education designed to increase the skills of the workforce have a long history in Singapore. In 
the early days, these were mainly directed at school leavers, and provided on a full-time basis. 
However, the national system shifted towards providing more flexible opportunities for those 
in work to upgrade their skills.  The process began with the creation of the Skills 
Development Fund (SDF) in 1979, which provided employers with funding for training their 
workers. This was supplemented by the establishment of the Lifelong Learning Endowment 
Fund (LLEF) in 2001. 
 
In 2003, a more comprehensive system of lifelong learning emerged with the creation of the 
Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA) under the Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM). The WDA was established to help address the problems arising  from the financial 
crisis in the early 2000s through workforce skills upgrading, and currently spearheads all 
lifelong learning initiatives with the vision of “a competitive workforce, with workers 
learning for life, and advancing with skills” (WDA, 2014a:B). To this end, it took over the 
management of the SDF and the LLEF. Its objectives include “help(ing) workers find jobs” 
(WDA, 2014b), and one of its current focus areas is to help low-income workers “progress 
into better paying jobs” (WDA, 2014c).  Sung (2011) argues that Singapore’s lifelong 
learning provision is remarkable in two dimensions: first, it has a single body, the WDA, to 
lead and administer all the state-led programmes and initiatives and, second, the WDA 
directly aligns key economic strategies of the government with lifelong learning provision.  
 
The concept of and the approach to lifelong learning in Singapore is described using phrases 
such as "pragmatic and rational", "the economic drivers" for competitiveness, or "an antidote 
against unemployment" (Kumar, 2004:559). A number of policies promoting lifelong 
learning and, with this, ‘lifelong employability’, have been launched, primarily by the 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM), to enhance the country’s global competitiveness and to 
address a range of social and economic problems. These include a rapidly ageing population, 
the decline of the manufacturing sector, the growing demand for high-skilled workers, and 
the difficulties that low-skilled local workers face in finding stable (e.g. permanent) 
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employment with adequate income (Bound et al., 2015) and coping with the rising cost of 
living. 
 
Singapore’s high rate of economic growth  it ranks as the world’s richest nation according 
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2010 (WSJ, 2012)  and the strong 
performance of its pupils on cross national tests such as PISA have led many commentators, 
especially those who view investment in human capital (or ‘skills’) as the primary source of 
economic growth, to portray it as a model of best educational practice (e.g. OECD, 2010). 
Singapore has been regularly cited as the inspiration for educational reform by policy 
advocates such as the OECD and McKinsey; and especially in England (Morris, 2012). 
Hargreaves (2012:7) describes it as pioneering the ‘fourth way’ of educational reform which 
is “characterised by inspiring success stories of educational leadership and change that have 
led to remarkable leaps forward in student learning and achievement”.  
 
Whilst Singapore’s overall economic and educational achievements have been the subject of 
extensive and often panegyric commentary, there is comparatively little coverage of the 
consequences for those less well positioned to benefit from its economic and education 
strategies and the impact of economic globalization.  
 
Along with its strong record of economic growth, Singapore has seen a rapidly rising level of 
income inequality since the 1990s, and has remained the most unequal nation in terms of 
income distribution among all the developed economies for more than a decade (The Straits 
Times, 2013; OECD, 2014a).Dunn and Norton ( 2013) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) 
argue that inequality negatively affects the society in many areas such as happiness, trust and 
also physical health of the members of the society. In particular, it creates unequal access to 
skills development opportunities for those who are at the bottom rung of the society, which 
then reinforces income inequality.  
 
The next two sections analyse the nature of the narrative in policy documents relating to 
lifelong learning and income inequality. Our main sources of data are the Straits Times 
newspaper, the National Archives of Singapore, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime 
Minister's Office. Following this, we describe and analyse the nature of lifelong learning 
policy in terms of provision for both low and highly skilled workers. This study focuses on 
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the current policy actions and examines documentary sources describing those policies 
derived from the MOM, the main driver and provider of lifelong learning programmes. We 
acknowledge that some issues arise from the use of a wide range of official data sources, 
especially with regard to their comparability over time and across nations. However, space 
precludes us from investigating this further.  
 
Subsequently, we primarily analyse official statistics to provide a comparative analysis of a 
range of socio-economic indicators relating to income inequality, productivity, public 
expenditure, and the quality of life. We compare Singapore with the 21 OECD countries that 
have GDP per capita of more than US$30,000 (OECD, 2014b), which are grouped into the 
three economic models identified by Green (2002; 2006): the Shareholder or neo-liberal 
model (comprising mostly English speaking/Anglo Saxon countries, specifically the USA 
and England) ), the Stakeholder or social market model (mostly core European countries), 
and the Nordic or social democratic model (mostly northern European countries). The 
‘Shareholder’ model is characterised as free competition with low regulation of the market 
and low public expenditure; it generates more jobs and economic growth, but at the expense 
of high levels of inequality. In contrast, the ‘Stakeholder’ model involves high level 
regulation of  the market and labour, and more spending on social welfare; this leads to a 
more equal and cohesive society, but comes with less jobs and lower growth. The Nordic 
model involves strong market regulation and generous social spending. Green (2006) argues 
that this has been associated with a strong economy and a low level of inequality. With its 
high level of income inequality and low level of public expenditure (ILO, 2014: also refer to 
Figure 9 in the later part of the paper), Singapore exemplifies the ‘Shareholder’ model.  
 
We argue, firstly, that the state’s narrative around the nature and purpose of lifelong learning 
has allocated responsibility for the widening income gap onto the poor/unskilled ; however 
the nature of lifelong learning provision has resulted in it being more beneficial to skilled 
than unskilled workers. Secondly, we show that the lowest paid have seen their incomes 
decline and overall indicators of the population’s quality of life suggest that it is 
comparatively poor. 
 
The policy narrative: education and lifelong learning 
Singapore faced many challenges when it lost its hinterland with the unexpected separation 
from Malaysia in 1965. The prospect of massive unemployment was imminent with the 
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British announcement to withdraw its troops, which “contributed to 20% of Singapore’s GDP” 
and “employed 10% of the local labour force” (Leong, 2011:23). Therefore, ‘survival’ was 
the priority in a country with scarce resources and social issues that included high 
unemployment rates and racial conflict (Chiew et al., 1991; Chua, 1995; Han, 2009). Most of 
the workforce was unskilled, and the state successfully promoted the rapid expansion of the 
labour-intensive manufacturing sector so as to generate jobs and produce economic growth 
via exports (EDB, 2014). Providing a supply of skilled workers was, and continues to be, one 
of the key strategies for the nation’s survival, and this is why education and training have 
been a priority for policy makers (Chua, 1995; Gopinathan et al., 2011).  
 
A pragmatic view has therefore dominated the political discourse around education since the 
early days of Singapore. For example, Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister who governed 
Singapore from 1959 to 1990, put it: 
 
We are a small country…we must nurture, train and educate our people and so organise 
our society, to enable us -- a nation of 2 million -- to match the performance and 
capacity of countries larger than us. To achieve this, the key is education. Every school, 
primary, secondary or university, all must train and educate our youth to bring out their 
best, a rugged and robust generation. They must have the capacity to contribute to 
national security and social order, and help the growth and development of our 
economy. (Lee, 1969) 
 
Also, a People’s Action Party (PAP)1 Member of Parliament, J F Conceicao explained: 
Education should show people how to put their learning, thinking and ideas into 
practice: Education is not education if it leaves one with an illusion about life. It should 
stimulate imagination as well as root one’s development firmly in the realities of one’s 
existence (The Straits Times, 1974)   
 
This view prevailed over the decades and a former Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, later 
explained the role of education clearly: 
 
A nation's wealth in the 21st Century will depend on the capacity of its people to 
learn...We have to prepare ourselves for a bracing future - a future of intense 
competition and shifting competitive advantages, a future where technologies and 
                                                     
Notes: 1 The People’s Action Party has ruled Singapore since independence from the British in 1959. 
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concepts are replaced at an increasing pace, and a future of changing values. Education 
and training are central to how nations will fare in this future. (Goh, 1997) 
 
That instrumental view of education and training is not limited to the state. Chiew et al. (1991) 
and Chua (1995) argue that individual Singaporeans also see education “as a means to obtain 
power and wealth rather than as an end (in) itself” (Chiew et al., 1991:51). The official 
portrayal of the nature and objectives of lifelong learning is generally in line with this view, 
and ‘jobs’, ‘employment’, ‘skills’ and ‘employability’ are keywords in most public speeches 
and statements. Alongside this is the PAP’s representation of Singapore since independence 
as a nation under permanent threat, one that requires strong leadership and a rapidly growing 
economy to ensure its survival. In the 1960s and 1970s, the same narrative was employed by 
the other East Asian developmental states, especially South Korea and Taiwan, that derived 
their legitimacy from providing citizens with improved economic wellbeing within a context 
of external threats to the nation (Gopinathan, 2007; Law 2009).  
 
In parallel the developmental states strongly harnessed the education system to provide the 
economy with skilled labour and to ensure a patriotic citizenry imbued with the prevailing 
national ideology (Law, 2009).  Where Singapore is concerned, the result is a form of 
constructed paranoia or, as Tan (2007a:2) terms it, the “politics of apprehension”. Indeed, the 
annual National Day Rally speech is often used to this end. As Tan explains, it is also used to 
disseminate related messages: 
 
Through this speech, enduring national values and principles that have constituted the 
official ideology – such as ‘‘survivalism,’’ ‘‘multiracialism,’’ ‘‘meritocracy’’ and 
‘‘pragmatism’’ – are reaffirmed and celebrated, even though they tend often to be little 
more than empty signifiers, or worse, a disguise through which the exploitations and 
excesses of capitalism may go unnoticed. (Tan, 2007b:293) 
 
Regular reinforcement of the ruling ideology through such messages has effectively ensured 
that the state’s activities are measured by their impact on economic growth, and policy 
discussions centre “on how the economic goals may be best achieved rather than on the 
desirability of the goals or their alternatives” (Chua, 1995:41). Education policy is no 
exception, and the logic and objectives of lifelong learning strongly reflect the state’s 
pragmatic perspective. 
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The policy narrative: income inequality and lifelong learning 
Similarly, the portrayal of income inequality in official discourse is framed with reference to 
economic growth; historically it has been described as a ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ phenomenon 
in the process of development and growth, although there has been a shift in its portrayal over 
time. In the 1970s, income inequality was portrayed as ‘beneficial’. As the then Minister for 
Defence, Goh Keng Swee, explained: 
 
The greater the inequality of wealth, the larger would be the proportion of national 
income saved. Big corporations and rich people saved a larger part of their earnings 
than the poor did. Savings made capital investment and economic growth possible. 
(The Straits Times, 1971a)  
 
The speech concludes that “inequality of income is good for economic growth” which has 
reduced unemployment rates and led to lower levels of social tension. (The Straits Times, 
1971a). In the same year, another PAP Member of Parliament, Augustine Tan, stated that 
widening inequality would lead to a better national economy because it would allow more 
social expenditure and more income for the poor (The Straits Times, 1971b). In brief, the 
basic propositions are that more inequality is good because the rich can save and invest more, 
which will result in national growth; and, economic growth will create more jobs for the poor 
and generate more taxes for the government, which can be used as public funding to assist the 
poor.  
 
These views prevailed before the early 1970s, but slowly gave way to a view of income 
inequality as an inevitable, but not necessarily ‘good’, by-product of economic growth. The 
Deputy Prime Minister in 1973, Goh Keng Swee describes the government’s strategy in 
dealing with inequality as an ‘approach’, whilst dismissing other countries’ efforts to resolve  
the  inequality issue via the redistribution of wealth as ‘succumbing to temptation’ and an 
‘assault’:  
 
Many governments have succumbed to temptation. They mount a direct assault on the 
problem of inequality. They argue “Why not take money from the rich and transfer it to 
the poor? Why not place restrictions on the rich, in order that the poor may catch up 
with them?” All these had been tried and without exception, they have failed…the PAP 
Government therefore decided that the way to help the poor is to provide more 
work...provide incentives to investors and not punish them…in Singapore this policy 
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has succeeded …we understand that an indirect approach will yield better results in the 
end than the direct assault. (Goh, 1973) 
 
In the same speech Goh also states:  
 
There are other countries in Asia which are entering into competition for foreign 
investments and whose wages are much lower than ours. There is, therefore, a built-in 
constraint on wage increases. It acts like Newton’s law of gravity pulling things 
downwards…when the Singapore worker has attained the level of this ideal type, the 
combined German-Japanese worker, he need not fear the pull of low level wages in 
Asian countries. He is working in another league, in which he will enjoy the same 
inverse law of gravity, which our engineers, doctors and architects are enjoying 
today…it promises great hope if the worker will make the effort. (Goh, 1973) 
 
The core propositions of Goh’s speech are still evident. However, the advent of globalization, 
technological change and rising income inequality has meant that the official discourse with 
regard to inequality has developed, and now consists of three basic messages. The first and 
most prevalent message echoes the earlier attribution of responsibility to the individual to 
upgrade their skills so as to improve their living standards:  
 
There will be a widening wage gap between ‘knowledge’ and unskilled workers as the 
region’s supply of unskilled workers rises. This will have social implications like 
bigger differences in the standards of living… unskilled workers should therefore 
upgrade themselves. (The Straits Times, 1999) 
 
The income inequality may be there but in absolute terms, I think we can improve lives 
for nearly everybody in the society provided they work at it and are prepared to make 
the effort. (Lee, 2014a) 
 
These messages are akin to what Exley and Ball (2011) term the 'blaming the victim' strategy, 
whereby policy makers blame individuals (victims) for social issues (policy failure). The 
importance of the individual’s effort is also reinforced through a carrot and stick approach. In 
the examples below, individuals are presented with the prospect of unemployment or higher 
income depending on whether they upgrade their skills or not: 
 
Unless we systematically upgrade our skills throughout our working life, we will wake 
up one day to find ourselves out of a job…we must therefore bring about a culture of 
lifelong learning. (Goh, 2000) 
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Truly a learning nation - where everyone keeps improving their skills, sees their pay 
improve over time. (Tharman, 2012) 
 
Notwithstanding the claim that more training will result in better jobs and incomes, there is 
also a belief in the innateness of people’s abilities; as Lee (2011) explains it: “the most 
capable, the most reliable, the one with the most potential to go into the most crucial job.”  
 
The second basic message also relates to responsibility, focussing not on the individual but 
on the sources of responsibility for the broader macroeconomic context: it is external factors, 
outside the control of the state, that are identified as the fundamental source of the problem of 
rising inequality. Specifically, it is globalization, technology, and low wages elsewhere in 
Asia that are the sources of disparity in income levels in Singapore. The quotes below are 
illustrative: 
 
Globalization favours economies like ours – open, nimble, and enterprising. But it also 
poses challenges, especially for our older and low-skilled workers whose wages and 
jobs are under growing pressure. (MOF, 2006:2) 
 
Technology is making many types of workers redundant, especially those with low 
skills, and also making it easy for their jobs to be exported abroad to where wages are 
lower for the same skills. (MOF, 2007:7-8) 
 
These external factors are also used to explain why the rich get richer, which then aggravates 
the level of inequality: 
 
Everybody’s incomes are rising, but at the top, the incomes are rising faster in many 
countries because of globalisation, because of technology. It is not because we have 
gone for growth and therefore it is happening. (Lee, 2014b) 
 
This portrayal, of a government facing unavoidable problems beyond its influence, is more 
explicit in the 2014 Budget Statement: “We cannot change the realities of global competition 
and technological advances that put pressure on less-skilled workers all over the world” 
(MOF, 2014:14). Brown and Tannock (2009) note that this reference to competition from a 
global meritocracy is often used to justify the import of high paid workers. 
 
The third basic message combines an elaboration on the solution to the problem of inequality 
with a justification of current economic policies. The primary solution is for low-skilled/paid 
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workers to work harder and upgrade their skills, while existing economic and social policies 
(that promote globalization, wealth creation and labour importation) are justified by reference 
to ‘trickle down’ economics (Stiglitz, 2012) which claims that greater growth will trickle 
down (either because the rich spend more/create jobs or because more public expenditure will 
result) and eventually benefit the poor. For example, in 1983 the then Deputy Prime Minister 
and Education Minister, Goh Keng Swee, said: 
 
Income inequality in itself is not harmful to growth. It may be beneficial if large 
savings are generated and reinvested in the country. (The Straits Times, 1983) 
 
This resonates with the message in 2014 by the Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong: 
 
In the countries with no growth, their income distributions are often even worse 
because at the low end, you have no hope of improving your life. But with growth, we 
bring everybody up, even though we cannot bring everybody up at the same speed. 
(Lee, 2014b) 
 
As in the 1970s, the state continues to warn against any attempts to redistribute wealth: 
 
The solution is not to grow more slowly, or to focus less on growth and more on 
redistribution…if we do that, it will only hurt the people we are trying to help. Slow 
growth will make everybody worse off…our response therefore must be to focus on 
growth and embrace globalisation. (MOF, 2007:9) 
 
If you work hard, you will have a better life.  And that’s what we are trying to do.  To 
bring the high income people down just so that we can say we are more equal, I don’t 
think that is helpful.  (Lee, 2014c) 
 
In brief, the state’s message to workers is clear: those on low income should work harder to 
upgrade their skills and earn more; the wealthy should continue to get rich in order to sustain 
economic growth; and the unemployed should get jobs. Within this overall policy context, 
lifelong learning plays a critical role as it provides the means for workers to upgrade their 
skills, increase their productivity, get better jobs and improve their income levels.  
 
For those who are not in employment, the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explains: 
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Work is better than any social safety net we can craft and it is better than any social 
transfer that we can arrange…(The) best thing is (for) you (to) have a job; you (will 
then) have assurance for the future. (Lee, 2014d) 
 
In comparison to this strong focus on workers, jobs and upgrading skills, those not able to 
work for reasons other than insufficient skills or motivation - e.g. age, intellectual or physical 
disability, family responsibilities - tend to be excluded from the discourse on lifelong learning, 
and learning opportunities not related to employment are minimal. The elderly have been 
described as a ‘silver tsunami’, and exhorted to minimise the burden they put on public 
services by ageing ‘actively’ and ‘positively’ (Lim, 2011). Likewise, under the mantle of 
meritocracy, people with disability are frequently marginalised and resources are 
concentrated on the most able (Tan, 2014:6).  
 
From the above we can extract the key propositions of the policy narrative: 
1. Lifelong learning can increase an individual’s skills, productivity, employability and 
income level, which will lead to better jobs for individuals, reduced income inequality, 
more investment by employers, and economic growth for the nation.  
2. Economic growth will create jobs and more tax income will be generated (especially 
by the very rich) for the nation, which the government can spend on enhanced public 
services, especially for the poor. 
3. Living standards and the quality of life will be enhanced for all, with workers earning 
higher incomes and the nation having more funding for social services.  
 
We examine these propositions below, beginning with the nature of lifelong learning 
provision in Singapore. We then look at the outcomes of lifelong learning provision. 
 
Lifelong learning programmes 
This section examines the first proposition of the policy narrative by reviewing what lifelong 
learning programmes have been implemented and how they have attempted to help those at 
the bottom of the society.  
 
Currently, the WDA offers a total of 15 lifelong learning programmes and initiatives. 
Programmes targeting the low-skilled are designed to provide financial assistance to those out 
of work or on low incomes, if they are enrolled on a training programme.  
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We analyse the 15 programmes with regard to three dimensions: the direct recipients (whom 
the provision/programme is intended to help), the employment status of beneficiaries, and the 
skills levels of beneficiaries.  
 
The programmes differentiate between and are provided for low–skilled workers and higher-
skilled ones, who are termed Professionals, Managers and Executives (PMEs).  In Singapore 
most ‘low-skilled’ workers are ‘low-waged’ (Gog et al., 2014). Table 1 is an overview of the 
programmes and shows whom they are targeted at: PMEs/the low-skilled; individuals/ 
employers, and the employed/unemployed. Of those provided for individuals, it can be seen 
that seven cater for only PMEs, and three for only the low-skilled; only two cater for both. 
 
There is only a small difference between the total number of policy actions for the employed 
and those for the unemployed - nine versus eight. So both these groups are fairly equally 
provided for.  However, a more substantial gap exists between provision for the low-skilled 
and PMEs. We examine this in more details from three different perspectives.  
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Direct recipients of 
provision 
Employment status 
of beneficiaries 
Skills levels of  
beneficiaries 
Individuals Employers Employed Unemployed 
Low-
skilled 
PMEs 
Scholarship 
Programmes          
CET (Continuing 
Education and 
Training) 
Qualification Award 
(CQA)        
Creative Industries 
FReelancers 
Enhanced Support for 
Courses (CI 
FRESCO)          
Job Placement 
Programmes       
 
 
Professional 
Conversion 
Programmes       
 
 
Max Talent          
Productivity 
Initiatives in Services 
& Manufacturing 
(PRISM)         
Skills Training for 
Excellence 
Programme (STEP)        
Workfare Training 
Support (WTS)         
WorkPro   
 
    
Traineeship 
Programme       
 Enterprise Training 
Support (ETS)        
English @ Workplace          
Integrated Manpower 
Programme    
 
  
 Productivity and 
Innovation 
Programme (PRIME)          
Total number of  
programmes 12 9 9 8 7 10 
Table 1: Lifelong learning programmes and initiatives by the WDA (Derived from WDA, 
2014e) 
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Figure 1: Percentage of programmes for the low-skilled and PMEs by types of direct 
recipients 
 
Firstly, as shown in Figure 1, the programmes for PMEs are targeted mainly at the ‘individual’ 
workers, whilst those for the low-skilled are mostly targeted at either the ‘employers’ or both. 
This suggests that PMEs are given much more freedom and flexibility in accessing lifelong 
learning programmes with little need to engage employers in the process. In the Skills 
Training for Excellence Programme (STEP) for PMEs, which targets ‘both’ individuals and 
employers, its description explains: 
 
The aim is to give employers and PMEs a sustained skill development pathway, where 
PMEs can plan their career progression pathway, while employers can leverage it for 
their companies' future development plan. (WDA, 2014f) 
 
In contrast, programmes for the lower skilled require employers to make the key decisions, 
such as who will participate, when and where, leaving little room for individuals to make 
choices.  
 
Another difference is the financial support and qualifications available to the low and high 
skilled. Generally those for PMEs offer higher level qualifications and higher levels of 
funding for participants. For example, most of the Scholarship Programmes for PMEs 
provide 80% to 100% subsidy for Bachelor’s or Master’s degree programmes that amounts to 
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more than SGD30,0002 per person. The highest amount available for PMEs is SGD100,000 
for WDA Healthcare Scholarships, which includes not just course fees but also various 
stipends and allowances. In contrast, most funding for the low-skilled goes to WSQ courses 
which have ‘higher diploma’ as the highest level qualification; are not offered by Universities; 
and the subsidy for most courses is below SGD1,000. The highest amount available under the 
WTS scheme is SGD12,350, which is given to ‘Diploma in Industrial Design’ and is only 12% 
of the maximum funding amount for PMEs. 
 
Thirdly, compared to the limited options for the low-skilled, PMEs are offered a wide variety 
of support (see Table 2).  
 
Programmes and initiatives for PMEs Types of training or qualifications 
Scholarship Programmes 
 
Graduate diploma, Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees 
Creative Industries FReelancers Enhanced 
Support for Courses (CI FRESCO) 
 
Workforce Skills Qualifications (WSQ) courses 
Job Placement Programmes 
 
Diploma, Bachelor’s degree, work attachment 
Professional Conversion Programmes 
 
Diploma, Bachelor’s degree, work attachment 
Max Talent Comprehensive place-and-train programme 
(workshops, on-the-job training, mentoring, etc) 
Productivity Initiatives in Services & 
Manufacturing (PRISM) 
WSQ courses, conferences, seminars, cross sectoral 
on-site projects (with coaching and mentorship) 
Skills Training for Excellence Programme 
(STEP) 
Courses, seminars, advisory services, etc 
Table 2: Types of training or qualifications available for PMEs (Derived from WDA, 2014c) 
 
The provision for PMEs contrasts with that for ‘low-skilled’ workers which is summarised in 
Table 3: 
 
 
 
                                                     
Notes: 2 The dollar figures in this paper are given in SGD (Singapore dollars). USD1 is equivalent to 
SGD1.3213 as of 31 Dec, 2014. 
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Key eligibility Provision for individuals 
 Provision for 
employers 
Types of training 
or qualifications 
Workfare 
Training 
Support 
(WTS)  
 targets the 
‘employed’ 
and provides 
workers with 
funding 
support for 
skills training 
that is linked 
to formal 
qualifications 
 
- Employed 
- Age: 35 years or 
above 
- Monthly income: 
SGD1900 or less  
Course fee funding: 95% 
- 100% 
Course fee funding: 
95% - 100% 
Certificate, 
Diploma or Higher 
Diploma (offered 
by WSQ, 
Polytechnic, 
Institute of 
Technical 
Education, etc.) 
Milestone award: up to 
SGD600 (applicable only 
for English literacy or 
numeracy improvement) 
Absentee payroll 
funding: 95% 
Training allowance: 
SGD4.50 per hour 
  
Training commitment 
award: up to SGD400 a 
year 
  
WorkPro 
targets the 
‘unemployed’ 
and provides 
individuals 
with financial 
and non-
financial 
assistance to 
find a job or 
to stay in the 
job, which do 
not involve 
formal 
training 
courses or 
qualifications.. 
- Unemployed for 
3 months or more 
- Age: 40 years or 
above 
- Monthly income: 
SGD1900 or less  
Before employment - Job 
preparation workshop and 
job search assistance 
Workplace 
improvement and 
job-redesign grants: 
up to SGD480,000 
Job preparation 
workshop, work 
attachment, 
mentorship 
After employment - 
Transport allowance: 
SGD200 (applicable only 
for monthly household 
income SGD3000 or 
below) 
Recruitment and 
retention incentives: 
up to SGD100,000 
After employment - 
Mentor guidance 
Mentorship 
allowance: SGD100 
per mentor 
After employment - 
Retention bonus: up to 
SGD1200 
  
Traineeship 
Programme 
targets the 
‘unemployed’ 
and provide 
individuals 
with financial 
and non-
financial 
assistance to 
find a job or 
to stay in the 
job, which do 
not involve 
formal 
training 
courses or 
qualifications. 
- Unemployed 
- Age: no 
restriction 
- Income: no 
restriction 
Before employment - 
Training allowance: up to 
SGD360 (SGD4.50 per 
hour and maximum 80 
hours) 
No direct grants or 
funding is given, 
but trainees are 
provided for up to 
80 hours work 
without any wage 
or benefits 
Work attachment 
Before employment - 
Completion Incentive: 
SGD200 
After employment - 
Retention Incentive: 
SGD300 
Table 3: Lifelong learning schemes for the low-skilled and low-income (Derived from WDA, 
2014g; WDA, 2014h; WDA, 2014i) 
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Overall, a comparison of Tables 1, 2 and 3 shows that the features of the three schemes for 
the low-skilled differ from the seven schemes for PMEs with regard to: the level of autonomy 
for individuals, the financial support and qualifications, and the variety of schemes. Moreover, 
some programmes for the low-skilled have features that discourage or deter them from 
accessing the schemes. For example, under the Traineeship Programme and the WorkPro, 
individuals get funding only when they work for WDA-registered companies. However, 
many companies are not willing to engage in the scheme given its complexity and the names 
of the registered companies are not publicly available. Consequently, it is difficult for 
individuals to get information on a company’s registration status during the recruitment 
process. In the Traineeship Programme, the names of WDA-registered companies are 
published on the WDA website. As of December 2014, only 93 companies - mostly childcare, 
food and beverage services providers - were registered (WDA, 2014j).  This is a negligible 
number considering there are 411,412 business entities as of 2013 (ACRA, 2014).  Therefore, 
the vast majority of the low-waged are working for unregistered companies, and are not 
eligible for funding from the WorkPro or Traineeship Programme.   
 
Despite the uneven distribution of provision and structural barriers against low-skilled 
individuals, lifelong learning continues to be positioned as the means to climb up the income 
ladder. While Singapore’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has doubled from SGD183 billion 
in 2000 to SGD364 billion in 2013, the total public expenditure on lifelong learning through 
the SDF and the LLEF has almost tripled (from $120 m. to $351m) in the eight years from 
2005.  
 
Lifelong learning outcomes 
However, the increase in funding has not been accompanied by a similar increase in 
participation rates as Figure 2 shows; training intensity (which measures mean training days 
per adult) has declined since 2010. Official data does not disaggregate the expenditure on 
different programmes but given the different levels of provision outlined above it is probable 
that the increased funding has primarily been used to support PMEs. 
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Figure 2: Singapore lifelong learning participation rates and training intensity (mean 
training days per adult) for aged 15 to 64, 2003 to 2013 (MOM, 2014b:9) 
 
Singapore’s participation rates generally are low compared to other developed countries. 
Figure 3 shows that people in countries with lower levels of income inequality, such as those 
using the Stakeholder model, tend to participate more in lifelong learning than those in 
countries with higher levels, such as Singapore. This inverse proportion of lifelong learning 
participation rates to the income inequality level is in line with how inequality negatively 
affects the society. 
 
Figure 3: Lifelong learning participation rates by employment status, 2012 (Derived from 
MOM, 2014c; OECD, 2014c:390) 
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Figure 3 also indicates that Singapore has the highest ratio of difference between the 
participation rates of the employed and unemployed. Similar gaps are observed between other 
categories of social groups in Singapore: full-time (participation rates of 35%, training 
intensity of 3.6), younger (40%, 10.2), more educated (46%, 6.2) and higher skilled (41%, 
4.4 ) workers , are more involved in lifelong training activities than part-time (18%, 2.5), 
older (23%, 1.3), less educated (13%, 0.4) and lower skilled (15%, 0.8) workers (MOM, 
2014c). These figures suggest that policy actions have been more effective at targeting and 
benefitting more highly skilled, affluent and educated workers. 
 
The pattern that emerges is that the provision of lifelong learning is markedly differentiated 
for the skilled and unskilled; provision for the latter is less favourable than that for the former 
and low skilled workers are primarily supported to engage in training for other low skilled 
jobs. The basic assumption that underlies this pattern of differential provision seems to be 
that low-skilled workers will upgrade their skills (and income) within something akin to a 
zone of proximal career development.  
 
Also, the three lifelong learning programmes for the low-skilled we discussed above (see 
Table 3) in practice play a direct social welfare role by offering monetary help to people with 
no or low incomes. Brown & Lauder (2001:185) describe the use of lifelong learning for 
welfare provision as “a cheap form of social policy in which some of the unemployed are 
driven into the rear end of the labour market as a way of removing them from the streets and 
the unemployment statistics”. 
From our analysis of the policy narrative we identified a number of both implicit and explicit 
claims about both lifelong learning and income inequality; namely that lifelong learning 
would improve workers skills, allow them to get better paid jobs, reduce income inequality 
and increase productivity; and, that income inequality would result in greater public revenue, 
enhanced social services and a better quality of life for the poor. We examine these below. 
 
Income inequality and poverty 
The evidence suggests that whilst most citizens have benefitted from economic growth, the 
situation for those with the lowest level of skills/income has not improved significantly.  
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Figure 4 compares Singapore with the other OECD nations in terms of two measures of 
income inequality, namely the Gini coefficient and the ratio of earnings of the top and bottom 
10% of workers. It shows that the richest 10% in Singapore earned 16.9 times more than the 
poorest 10%, and the country’s Gini coefficient (0.478) was the highest amongst the OECD 
countries in 2014. The Gini coefficient has increased since 1990 when it was 0.408 (The 
Straits Times, 2013). Although the income gap has widened in many other developed nations, 
Singapore’s situation is noteworthy due to “the speed at which it has increased as well as the 
level which it has increased to” (Bhaskaran et al., 2012:5).  This is in marked contrast to the 
period prior to about 1990 when Singapore’s growth was accompanied by a low level of 
income inequality (Morris 1996). 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Gini coefficient ‘around 2010s’ and the ratio of the top and bottom 
10% for Singapore and OECD countries with more than USD30,000 GDP per capita 
(Derived from DOS, 2014a; OECD, 2014b:65; World Bank, 2014) 
 
The pattern of income inequality across countries shown in Figure 4 is generally consistent 
with the three models identified by Green (2002; 2006).  
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Figure 5 compares the nominal monthly income in Singapore (not adjusted for inflation over 
time) for the top and bottom 10% of households from 2000 to 2013. While the income of the 
bottom 10% shows an increase of 22%, that of the top 10% increased by 84%. In 2013, the 
top 10% earned 17.3 times more than the bottom 10%, much higher than the 11.6 times 
figure in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 5: Average Monthly Household Nominal Income from Work (Excluding Employer 
CPF Contributions) Among Resident Employed Households by Deciles, 2000 – 2013 
(Derived from DOS, 2014a) 
 
Although low-income households have earned 22% more since 2000, and hence it could 
appear to suggest that ‘trickle-down economics’ is working, Singapore has the highest 
inflation rate among developed nations (World Bank, 2013) and inflation has a greater impact 
on the poor. Figure 6 shows the average changes in the annual growth rate of real income, 
and the total change of real income for each decile, from 2000 to 2013. Whilst the income 
level of most deciles has increased, that of the bottom 10% decreased between 2000 and 2013.  
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Figure 6: Average and total annual growth rates of real income from 2000 to 2013 (Derived 
from DOS, 2014a) 
 
The data in Figures 5 and 6 excludes the income of those not working, foreigners and people 
over 65. Most foreign workers, comprising 38% of the total workforce (MOM, 2014a), are 
either high-income professionals or low skilled migrant workers (Dhamani, 2008; 
Mukhopadhaya, 2014). Neither does the data include any sources of non-wage income, such 
as dividends or profits from the value of assets such as property. The disparity between the 
top and bottom levels of income would be even greater if all workers in Singapore were 
included.  
 
The high level of income inequality is reinforced by a broader structural shift within the 
labour market that is occurring in Singapore and other advanced economies, namely that 
there is a ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market: high income jobs are growing and middle 
income jobs are shrinking, while low income jobs remain fairly stable (See Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Percentage of workers by occupation groups based on income levels, Singapore 
(Derived from MOM, 2014e) 
 
 The claim that skills upgrading will result in better jobs and social mobility is more likely if 
the knowledge economy requires less unskilled workers and more high-skilled workers, and 
that the middle income jobs grow. In reality, however, Figure 7 clearly shows that middle 
income jobs are diminishing in Singapore and as Keep and James (2012: 211) comment: 
 
 “The notion that dull, routine, lower-paid employment would be swept away by a tide 
of knowledge work proved not to be the case with one in five workers currently in low-
paid, often dead-end employment and the proportion of such employment unlikely to 
dwindle this side of 2020. 
. 
It is also predictable that the prevailing system of ‘hereditary meritocracy’ will be 
strengthened as high income earners are in the best position to provide family support for and 
secure the best schooling and jobs for their children. A low level of intergenerational income 
mobility in Singapore has been confirmed by a number of researchers (for example, Ng et al., 
2009).  Brown and Lauder (2001:135) argue that meritocracy no longer offers genuine equal 
opportunities as Singapore is becoming a “parentocracy where the education a child receives 
will conform to the wealth and wishes of parents rather than the abilities and efforts of 
pupils”. Wealth and poverty are likely to be passed down to the next generation, and 
inequality will intensify.  
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Whilst income inequality reflects relative rather than absolute poverty there are signs that the 
latter does exist and is growing. Despite the absence of any official measures of absolute 
poverty (e.g. a minimum household income level) and the belief that rapid growth has 
eradicated poverty, Yeoh (Undated) estimates that there were approximately 110,000 to 
140,000 resident households that have great difficulty meeting their basic needs. He identifies 
three distinct groups who make up this number: the working poor; comprising between 
70,000 to 90,000 households with at least one fully employed member whose wages are 
insufficient to meet the basic needs of the household without financial assistance; the 
unemployed poor , approximately 20,000 households without employment: and poor retiree 
households, comprising approximately 20,000 to 30,000 households. Donaldson et al. (2013) 
estimates the absolute poverty rate in 2012 was between 10% and 14% of households. Ng 
(2016) argues that absolute poverty has risen since the 1980’s but has not returned to the very 
high levels of the 1960’s and 1970’s. These estimates exclude the large number of low-paid 
foreign workers. 
 
Two groups of females in Singapore; namely older unmarried women (who do not benefit 
from their husbands pensions) and unmarried mothers, have been identified (Smith e. al., 
2015) as acutely at risk of falling into absolute poverty .Both groups have less opportunity to 
build up savings over their life time as they often spend more time caregiving and less time in 
the paid workforce. Further, women tend to live longer than men. Unmarried mothers are 
especially at risk as they are ineligible for some types of Government assistance, including 
housing benefits. 
 
In summary, despite an increase in lifelong learning provision by the state over the past 
decade, income inequality has risen at an unprecedented level; the lowest income workers are 
earning less in real terms than before and the middle income jobs are declining. Further, there 
are indications that a significant number of families are living in absolute poverty. Below we 
examine how productivity has fared. 
 
Productivity  
Despite a substantial investment in lifelong learning activities over the past decade through 
SDF and LLEF, Singapore’s rate of productivity growth fell from 5.2% in the 1980s to 3.1% 
in the 1990s and then to 1.8% in the 2000s (OECD, 2013). 
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Figure 8 provides a longitudinal perspective and indicates that productivity growth has 
fluctuated markedly and been broadly aligned with the global economic situation.  
Productivity growth went below 0% in 1998, 2001, 2008 and 2012 in times of recession 
when real GDP growth also declined. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI, 2014:11) 
confirms this: “the correlation between GDP and productivity growth is more than 80 per 
cent”. Figure 8 also shows little correlation between productivity growth rates and major 
lifelong learning initiatives between 2001 and 2010.  
 
 
Figure 8: Singapore’s productivity and real GDP growth rates 1998-2013 (MTI, 2014:11) 
and lifelong learning milestones  
 
Chua and Chaw (2012) argue that low productivity is caused by Singapore's heavy 
dependence on foreign workers, as there is little need for employers to invest in improving 
productivity through better technology or practices. They also argue that the large supply of 
cheap foreign labour contributes to the widening income gap (Chua & Chaw, 2012; Dhamani, 
2008) because the wages of low-skilled Singaporeans are suppressed. 
 
Public expenditure and taxation 
We saw earlier the claim that lifelong learning will generate more income for ‘individuals’ 
and higher productivity for ‘employers’; these will then generate more tax income for the 
‘nation’ and eventually allow more public expenditure to help the needy. A different picture 
emerges from examining the data. Singapore, as a country that has achieved the highest GDP 
per capita in the world has one of the lowest levels of public expenditure (see Figure 9). It 
spent only 2.8% of its GDP in 2011 on social protection; which is lower than the average in 
Asia or Africa (5.3% and 5.1% respectively) (ILO, 2014). The highest level of spending 
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occurred in 2009 (ILO, 2014), shortly after the 2008 global financial crisis, when spending 
increased to help the poor cope during the economic downturn (Tan, 2011), but the increase 
did not last. 
 
 
Figure 9: Public social protection expenditure, 1990 to latest available year (% of GDP) 
(Derived from ILO, 2014) 
 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) also reported that Singapore spent more on 
social expenditure for active age adults than older persons (see Figure 10). Only 15 out of 
total 172 countries showed such a tendency, and most of these are developing or less 
developed countries.  
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Figure 10: Public social protection expenditure by guarantee, latest available year (% of 
GDP) (Derived from ILO, 2014) 
 
Taxation policies represent the state’s attitude towards the desired level and sources of public 
revenue. Figure 11 shows the main taxes and the changes to the rates since 2002. A number 
of observations can be made. First, Singapore has no tax on capital gains (e.g. income from 
interest and stock trading), and estate duty was abolished in 2008 (IRAS, 2014a). The 
corporate tax rate was 40% in the 1960s (Dhamani, 2008), but was reduced to 17% in 2010.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Tax rate changes in Singapore from 2002 to 2013 (Derived from IRAS, 2014a; 
IRAS, 2014b) 
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Similarly, the individual income tax rate for top earners was 28% in 2002, was reduced to 20% 
in 2007 and then increased to 22% in 2015. 
 
In contrast, the regressive goods and services tax (GST), which was introduced in 1994 and 
remained at 3% until 2002, was increased to 7% in 2007. Overall, the pattern shown in Figure 
11 suggests a clear shift between 2002 and 2013: the tax burden of the wealthier members of 
society and the corporate sector declined markedly whilst that of the less affluent has 
increased. Further, the absence of any taxation on assets or capital gains ensures that rent 
seeking behaviour is not subject to taxation and will contribute to a growing level of capital 
inequality, which Piketty (2014) argues, is a greater risk to societies than income inequality. 
Overall, such taxation policies favouring the rich are likely to further widen the gaps between 
the rich and the poor.  
 
The quality of life  
A Gallup survey measuring “the subjective quality of people’s lives” (Gallup, 2013:24) 
reports that only 33% of Singaporeans responded that they were ‘thriving’, while 64% 
described themselves as ‘struggling’ and 4% ‘suffering’. The same survey claims that only 9% 
of Singaporeans are ‘engaged’ at work, which is defined as those who are “emotionally 
invested in and focused on creating value for their organizations every day” (Gallup, 2013:6); 
“engaged, thriving employees have fewer health problems” and “add up to big savings for 
companies’ bottom line in terms of productivity and performance” (Gallup, 2013:47). 
 
While the Gallup surveys measure only the subjective aspects, the World Happiness Index by 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UN SDSN) captures 
various quantitative national statistics as well as subjective and qualitative aspects. In spite of 
the high scores in social and economic aspects such as GDP, life expectancy, education level, 
etc., Singapore’s overall score is comparatively low. The United Nations Human 
Development Index by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2014 also gives 
Singapore a comparatively low score on its life satisfaction index. 
 
Figure 12 provides a comparative illustration of the results of three surveys: the Gallup, UN 
SDSN and UNDP and contrasts Singapore’s results with the scores of nations comprising the  
three models identified earlier. 
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Figure 12: ‘Thriving’ (subjective quality of life) rates, happiness index and overall life 
satisfaction index (Derived from; Gallup, 2013:114-115; UNDP, 2014; UN SDSN, 2013:22) 
 
Overall these surveys suggest that nations comprising the Shareholder model are 
comparatively less happy and satisfied with their lives and enjoy their work less than those in 
the Stakeholder and Nordic models. Singapore specifically has a lower score on each of these 
measures, especially the quality of life, than the average of the Shareholder nations. Pickett 
and Wilkinson (2010) also report that Singapore combines the lowest level of trust and the 
highest income inequality amongst all the developed countries. Along with Dunn and Norton 
(2013), they argue, that more unequal societies tend to display lower levels of trust, which 
serves to undermine the happiness and health level of all members in a society.  
 
The findings (summarised in Table 4) from a comprehensive meta-analysis by the National 
Volunteer & Philanthropy Centre (NVPC) in 2013, also do not suggest that economic growth 
has created a happy society. The NVPC is a “national body that promotes and develops 
volunteerism and philanthropy” (NVPC, 2014) and it analysed various international and local 
statistics and research results to assess the ‘social health’ of Singapore.  
 
Category Findings 
Family Decreasing number of marriages, increasing divorce rates, cases of 
violence in families and eroding family values of trust and support 
are worrying trends. 
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Healthcare Healthcare needs in Singapore are rapidly increasing due to rise in 
ageing population and chronic illnesses. The cost of care in 
Singapore has been consistently increasing with high private and 
out-of-pocket expenditure.  
Housing and 
Transport 
Commuter stress and cost of transport are on the rise. Housing 
prices have also increased rapidly over the last few years and is 
becoming unaffordable, especially for the low wage earners. 
Income Security Declining trend in average monthly incomes and the increasing cost 
of living have made many Singaporeans feel vulnerable, especially 
those from lower-income families. Singaporeans, especially the 
lower income, are increasingly finding it difficult to cope with 
escalating costs.  
Individual Well-
being 
There is a growing sense of anxiety and dissatisfaction. Stagnating 
incomes and increasing cost of living were found to be the key 
drivers affecting their well-being. Individual resilience appears to 
be weakening while job engagement and satisfaction levels have 
been low. 
Table 4: The Singapore social health project report 2013 (Extracted from NVPC, 2013:4) 
 
The 2013 NVPC report suggests that, contrary to the state’s claim (MOF, 2007), the core 
social security systems - housing, retirement and healthcare – have provided inadequate 
support for Singaporeans. Extremely high rates of inflation in recent years have caused a 
higher cost of living, hitting the low-income earners the hardest especially in housing and 
healthcare. For instance, it reported: 
 
The growth rate of housing prices is outstripping that of monthly incomes. From 2001 
to 2011, the resale price index (RPI) increased at 7% per annum, whereas median 
monthly household income rose at 3.8% per annum…Resale flats are not accessible to 
the bottom 20% of young home buyers. (NVPC, 2013:15) 
 
Healthcare is becoming more expensive, particularly for the low-income group…The 
private expenditure on health has increased from 55% in 2001 to 64% in 2010 Private 
expenditure percentage peaked at 70% in 2007. This is much higher than in other 
countries such as Sweden (13%), the United Kingdom (16%) and the United States 
(46%). (NVPC, 2013:13) 
 
Similarly, the current retirement fund is insufficient for most Singaporeans. According to the 
NVPC report, Singapore was ranked “17th out of 18 countries for the adequacy of its system” 
in the 2012 Global Pension Index that assessed retirement fund systems (NVPC, 2013:17). 
The report also notes that a growing number of suicides, mental disorders, and disputes 
among neighbours have been reported, while job satisfaction “ranked second lowest globally”, 
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and people trust each other less and less (NVPC, 2013:19). These findings suggest that rapid 
economic growth has not been accompanied by an improvement in the quality of the lives of 
Singaporeans.  
 
Conclusion 
Singapore has made great economic and social progress in the 50 years since its emergence 
as a nation. This has been achieved by the (Developmental) state, which derives its 
legitimacy from achieving high levels of economic growth, adopting a shareholder or neo-
liberal model of economic development which prioritizes free competition with low 
regulation of the market and low public expenditure.  However, income inequality in 
Singapore has risen significantly over the last two decades and the indices of the ‘quality of 
life’ are poor. This scenario confirms the growing literature which argues that the 
consequences of the single-minded pursuit of economic neo-liberal policies are a rise in 
economic inequality, unhappiness and mistrust. The situation has been portrayed by the state 
as an inevitable consequence of globalization which can be alleviated if low-skilled/income 
workers work hard to upgrade their skills. The system of lifelong learning was designed to 
provide workers with the means to upgrade their skills and improve their incomes. The 
government has also promoted the claim that the poor will eventually benefit from high levels 
of growth and income inequality because of the trickle-down effect of increased public and 
private expenditure. Essentially therefore official rhetoric promotes three claims: the poor are 
responsible for their low level of skills and income; lifelong learning provides a means of 
skill upgrading and a pathway to greater productivity, higher incomes and a healthier society; 
and, the fruits of economic growth will ‘trickle down' and benefit the poor.    
 
The available data, however, shows little evidence to support these claims. Despite 
remarkable economic growth at a national level, and despite significant expansion of lifelong 
learning provision, productivity rates have not improved, income inequality has increased and 
social mobility has declined. We argue that, whilst the policy narrative and system of lifelong 
learning have effectively served to locate the responsibility for upgrading with the low-skilled, 
the broader economic context has seen a decline of middle income jobs and of socio 
economic mobility. In parallel, the nature of the lifelong learning programmes and initiatives 
offered by the government may have contributed to inequality by being more favourable to 
and catering more for high-skilled workers. The low-skilled have had more restricted 
opportunities to upgrade their skills, and there has been a comparatively low level of 
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participation from this group in lifelong learning programmes. We also examined available 
data that suggested that the ‘softer’ and more subjective indicators relating to non-economic 
factors, such as happiness and social cohesion, were in comparative terms worryingly low. . 
At a more generic level, our analysis demonstrates the continuing global popularity of 
‘lifelong learning’ as a flexible, symbolic and non-specific statement of policy intent which 
has been translated into practice by nations in ways which suit their prevailing socio–political 
contexts and priorities. It has also demonstrated the oft observed difficulties which are 
encountered in implementing the planned intentions of lifelong learning. (Centeno 2011; 
Bengtsson, 2013)    
 
If lifelong learning has not, as we have suggested, served to improve productivity, reduce 
inequality and increase social mobility then how can the government respond?  
Fundamentally, it will require recognition of what the comparative data presented earlier 
underlines; namely, that the pursuit of an intense form of the neo-liberal stakeholder model 
brings with it costs and that there are alternative models which offer different combinations 
of costs and benefits. As Bhaskaran et al (2012) opines, there is now maybe a need in 
Singapore for a new social compact between the government and the people; one that does 
not define society’s wellbeing solely in terms of the metric which is central to both the 
developmental state and neo-liberalism; namely economic growth..  
 
Smith et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive outline of the range of both short and long term 
policy actions that could help to reduce income inequality and poverty in Singapore. These 
include: move to an opt-out system of assistance; introduce a minimum wage; expand CPF, 
including unemployment insurance and/or wage insurance, and allow women who have 
worked as homemakers to access their husbands’ CPF accounts; further limit the number of 
foreign workers in Singapore; reform the education system, particularly with respect to the 
significance of the Primary School Leaving Exam; and, reform the tax system so as to include 
the taxation of assets. 
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